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Epistemic decision theorists aim to justify Bayesian norms by arguing that these
norms further the goal of epistemic accuracy — having beliefs that are as close as possi-
ble to the truth. The standard defense of Probabilism appeals to accuracy dominance: for
every belief state that violates the probability calculus, there is some probabilistic belief
state that is more accurate, come what may. The standard defense of Conditionalization,
on the other hand, appeals to expected accuracy: before the evidence is in, one should
expect to do better by conditionalizing than by following any other rule. We present a
new argument for Conditionalization that appeals to accuracy-dominance, rather than
expected accuracy. Our argument suggests that Conditionalization is a rule of coher-
ence: failing to plan to conditionalize is not just a bad response to the evidence; it is also
inconsistent.
1 Introduction
Epistemic decision theorists aim to justify Bayesian norms for credences by arguing that
these norms further the goal of epistemic accuracy — having beliefs that are as close as
possible to the truth. The standard defense of Probabilism, which says that your cre-
dences should obey the probability calculus, appeals to accuracy dominance: for every
belief state that violates the norm, there is some belief state that satisfies it that is more ac-
curate, come what may. The standard defense of Conditionalization, on the other hand,
appeals to expected accuracy: before the evidence is in, one should expect to do better
1
by conditionalizing than by following any other rule. We present a new argument for
Conditionalization that appeals to accuracy-dominance, rather than expected accuracy.
Our argument suggests that Conditionalization is a rule of coherence: failing to plan to
conditionalize is not just a bad response to the evidence; it is also inconsistent.
We begin, in section 2, by describing the epistemic decision theory framework, and
we present the standard accuracy-dominance justification for Probabilism. Then we
present the standard expected-accuracy argument for Conditionalization in section 3 and
describe some of its shortcomings in order to motivate our new accuracy-dominance
argument, which we present in section 5. In between, in section 4, we compare the
two standard pragmatic arguments for Conditionalization with the existing expected-
accuracy argument and our new accuracy-dominance argument to show that they pair
up naturally and to illuminate the structure of the accuracy-dominance argument. We
conclude in section 6 and prove our main theorem in the Appendix.
2 The Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Probabilism
Epistemic decision theorists hold that partial belief aims at achieving accuracy, or close-
ness to the truth. In other words, belief aims at avoiding inaccuracy, or distance from the
truth. Formally, we can characterise a measure of inaccuracy Is(c) as a function of two
arguments:
A credence function c whose inaccuracy is assessed. We follow the usual assumption
that c is defined over an algebra of propositions, or sets of worlds — we’ll call this
A. And we’ll assume that A is finite. We will not assume that c is a probability
function — only that its values lie between 0 and 1 inclusive.
A state of the world s against which c’s inaccuracy is assessed. c’s inaccuracy depends
partly on what c says about the world, and partly on how the world turns out.
A state of the world is a proposition which, for every proposition A in A, entails
either A or its negation. Thus, the states of the world form a partition on the set
of worlds — in each world, exactly one state obtains. Indeed, they form the most
fine-grained partition thatA contains. We’ll call the set of states S . And sometimes
we’ll say that a proposition A is true at a state s if s entails A, while A is false at s if
s does not entail A.
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Among the many ways of measuring inaccuracy, one class of measures is often sin-
gled out for special interest. This is the class of strictly proper inaccuracy measures, which
obey the following four constraints.
Separability There is a function i, which takes a state s in S , a credence function c de-




We might think of is(c, A) as giving the inaccuracy of the individual credence c(A)
in the state s.
Continuity is(c, A) is a continuous function of c(A).
Extensionality If vs(A) = vs′(A′) and c(A) = c′(A′), then is(c, A) = is′(c′, A′) (where vs
is the valuation function at the state of the world s — that is, vs(A) = 1, if s entails
A; and vs(A) = 0, if s entails ¬A).
Strict Propriety For every credence function p defined on A that obeys the axioms of






Separability requires that the inaccuracy of a belief state be decomposable as a sum of
the state’s inaccuracies about the different propositions in the domain; this makes the
inaccuracy measure additive. Continuity requires that the accuracy of an individual cre-
dence varies continuously with the credence. Extensionality requires that the inaccuracy
at a state of the credence assigned to a proposition by a credence function is a function
only of the truth value of that proposition at that state and the credence assigned to it.
Strict Propriety requires that probability functions be ‘smug’ by assigning themselves
higher expected accuracy than any other credence function.1





1For arguments in favour of Strict Propriety, see [Gibbard, 2008, Joyce, 2009, Horowitz, 2014, Pettigrew, 2016,
Konek, ms].
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Using the assumption that the correct measure of inaccuracy is a proper scoring rule,
epistemic decision theorists are able to defend many common norms. For instance, Predd
et al. [2009], Joyce [2009], and Pettigrew [2016] argue for Probabilism, the view that cre-
dence functions should conform to the probability calculus, by appealing to accuracy-
dominance considerations. The following properties play a central role in their argument.
Strong Accuracy-Dominance c∗ strongly accuracy-dominates c iff
• for all states s,
Is(c∗) < Is(c)
Weak Accuracy-Dominance c∗ weakly accuracy-dominates c iff
• for all states s,
Is(c∗) ≤ Is(c),
• and for some state s,
Is(c∗) < Is(c).
Someone who aims at accuracy should avoid credence functions that are even weakly
accuracy-dominated. This gives us the following norm:
Accuracy Dominance for Credence Functions A believer is rationally required not to
adopt a credence function c if there is an alternative credence function c∗ such that
(i) c∗ strongly accuracy-dominates c, and (ii) c∗ is not itself even weakly accuracy-
dominated by any other credence function.
Predd et al. [2009] show that Probabilism is necessary and sufficient for avoiding accuracy-
dominance: every non-probability function is strongly accuracy-dominated by a proba-
bility function, while no probability function is even weakly accuracy-dominated by any
other credence function. Thus, if we measure inaccuracy using a strictly proper inaccu-
racy measure, then Accuracy Dominance for Credence Functions entails Probabilism.
Arguments for norms other than Probabilism typically do not appeal to dominance
reasoning. The epistemic utility argument for the Principle of Indifference appeals to
minimax reasoning [Pettigrew, 2014]; while arguments for other norms — including
Conditionalization [Greaves and Wallace, 2006, Easwaran, 2013, Leitgeb and Pettigrew,
2010], reflection [Easwaran, 2013], conglomerability [Easwaran, 2013], and the Principal
Principle [Pettigrew, 2013] — appeal to considerations of expected accuracy. In expected
accuracy arguments, the idea is that, from the standpoint of some particular probability
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function, obeying the norm is a better epistemic bet than violating it. Unlike accuracy-
dominance, expected accuracy is defined only relative to a probability function.
It is often claimed that failure to conditionalize is a form of logical inconsistency over
time [Armendt, 1992] [Christensen, 1991, 1996], [Lewis, 2010]. (Much of the subsequent
debate centers on whether there is anything wrong with logical inconsistency over time.)
In light of expected accuracy arguments, this claim about logical consistency is puzzling.
It may be unreasonable to take a lousy bet, but there is nothing logically inconsistent
about doing so — for all anyone knows, you might win a fortune at the casino, and your
scratch lotto ticket might pay off.
An accuracy-dominance argument for Conditionalization, on the other hand, would
suggest that failure to conditionalize is a form of logical inconsistency.2 Just as there is
something inconsistent about preferences that leave a person vulnerable to a sure mon-
etary loss (independently of how contingent events turn out), there is something incon-
sistent about a belief-like state that leaves a person vulnerable to a sure loss of accuracy
(independent of how contingent events turn out). To be inconsistent is to set oneself for
epistemic failure, come what may.
A way of understanding the difference between inconsistency and mere unreason-
ableness is that norms of consistency take wide scope, while requirements of reasonable-
ness take narrow scope. If Conditionalization is a requirement of consistency, then what
you ought to do is: adopt a prior credence function and a plan for updating on your
evidence, such that your planned later credence is guaranteed to be equal to your earlier
credence conditional on subsequent evidence. If Conditionalization is a requirement of
reasonableness, on the other hand, what you ought to do when you have a particular prior
credence function is: plan to conditionalize on that prior credence function.
A few caveats are in order. First, Conditionalization may be both a requirement of
consistency (when read in wide-scope form) and a requirement of reasonableness (when
read narrow-scope form). So while our conclusion can’t be established by existing ar-
guments for Conditionalization, nothing in our argument shows that the existing ar-
guments are unsound. Second, even if Conditionalization is a requirement of consis-
tency, it may sometimes be rational to be inconsistent and violate Conditionalization.
As Vineberg [1997] points out, a flawed agent who can’t help holding an unreasonable
attitude may have to choose between making her attitudes consistent with the unreason-
2Vineberg [2001] makes an exactly analogous point about accuracy-dominance arguments for Probabilism.
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able attitude, and thereby more unreasonable, or making her other attitudes reasonable,
but thereby more inconsistent because of the unreasonable attitude’s fixity. Since consis-
tency may not always trump reasonableness, consistency may not always be rationally
required.
Still, there is value in establishing that Conditionalization is (among other things)
a requirement of consistency. Thinking of Conditionalization this way can provide in-
sight into what the norm requires of us (something wide-scope), why we should plan to
conditionalize (for many of the same reasons that we should conform to the probability
axioms), and when the norm of Conditionalization is trumped by other requirements (in
cases where reasonableness is more important than consistency, and we can’t have both).
In the next section, we will consider a representative expected-accuracy argument for
Conditionalization, by Greaves and Wallace [2006]. We will then adapt key elements of
the authors’ framework to create a new argument for Conditionalization — this time, an
accuracy-dominance argument.
3 Greaves and Wallace’s Expected-Accuracy Argument for
Conditionalization
Greaves and Wallace [2006] begin by assuming that every agent has
a prior credence function c, held at time t0, and assumed to be a probability function
defined on A, and
an evidence partition E = {E1, . . . , En} where each member of E is a proposition in A
that the believer might learn between t0 and a later time t1.
Agents are then meant to choose among the range of
credal acts, or functions a that map each member of E of E to a probability function aE
defined on A.3
On the intended interpretation, each credal act is a plan about which credence function to
adopt at t1 in light of evidence received between t0 and t1. The plan may call for different
credences to be adopted depending on which evidence is received. The plan represented
by the function a tells the believer to adopt credence function aE if she learns that E.
3We use “credal acts” to refer to what Greaves and Wallace call “available credal acts”. They also consider a
more fine-grained model in which credal acts are functions from states to probability functions. The objects that
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Within this framework, Greaves and Wallace give the following definition:
A conditionalization plan for credence function c is an act that maps each evidence propo-
sition E in E to c(·|E), whenever c(E) > 0. That is, a is a conditionalization plan for
c if c(A ∩ E) = c(E)aE(A) for all propositions A on which c is defined.
Next, they extend the definition of inaccuracy. Not only can we measure the inaccu-
racy of a credence function at a state of the world; we can also measure the inaccuracy
of a credal act at a state of the world. Remember: E is a partition. So, every state of
the world s entails exactly one evidence proposition in E , which we might write as Es.
Therefore, a believer who performs a credal act a at state s will end up adopting aEs , the
credence function that a assigns to the evidence proposition Es that is true at s. So the
accuracy of act a in state s is just the accuracy of aEs — that is, Is(a) := Is(aEs). The
measure of inaccuracy for credence functions thus uniquely determines the measure of
accuracy for credal acts.
Using two additional assumptions, Greaves and Wallace argue that believers are ra-
tionally required to conditionalize. The first of these assumptions is Strict Propriety. The
second assumption is
Minimize Expected Inaccuracy A believer with credence function c is rationally required
to choose a credal act that minimizes the expected degree of inaccuracy from the van-
tage point of c. Given a credal act a, its expected inaccuracy from the vantage point




Thus, a believer with credence function c is rationally required to choose a credal
act a∗ such that, for all credal acts a,
expc(I(a
∗)) ≤ expc(I(a))
From Strict Propriety, Greaves and Wallace derive two consequences: first, every con-
ditionalization plan on c has the same expected inaccuracy from the vantage point of c;
we are calling “credal acts” can be embedded in the fine-grained model, but the fine-grained model contains
additional unavailable credal acts. Since the unavailable credal acts do not correspond to viable epistemic plans,
we will henceforth ignore them.
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second, from the vantage point of c, every conditionalization plan on c has strictly lower
expected inaccuracy than every credal act that isn’t a conditionalization plan on c. Thus,
given the norm Minimize Expected Inaccuracy, believers with probabilistic credences
who are choosing between credal acts are rationally required to pick a conditionalization
plan on their credence function. That is, together with Strict Propriety, Minimize Ex-
pected Inaccuracy establishes a narrow scope version of the synchronic norm that Kenny
Easwaran [2013] calls Plan Conditionalization:
Plan Conditionalization (narrow scope) If you have a credence function c at t0, and you
know that between t0 and t1 you will learn which member of the partition E is true
(and nothing more), you should, at t0, plan to update by conditionalization when
the evidence comes in at t1.
But there is another narrow scope version of Conditionalization that is perhaps more
often stated. This version is genuinely diachronic.
Diachronic Conditionalization (narrow scope) If you have a credence function c at t0,
and between t0 and t1 you learn E and nothing more, then at t1 you should adopt
c(−|E) as your credence function.
Does the Greaves and Wallace argument also establish this? There are two ways in which
it might. First: you might think that it is irrational to make a plan at an earlier time to do
something at a later time and then at that later time not to follow through on that plan,
at least when nothing occurs in the interim that you did not account for as a possibility
when you were making the original plan. This is the principle that Sarah Paul [2014] calls
Diachronic Continence. Together, Plan Conditionalization (narrow scope) and Diachronic
Continence entail Diachronic Conditionalization (narrow scope).
Second: Minimize Expected Inaccuracy says that an agent should pick a credal act
that has minimal expected inaccuracy from the vantage point of their current credence
function. Now, suppose that you have credence function c at t0 and you learn E and
nothing more between t0 and t1. You are now at t1, and you are deciding how to re-
spond to learning E. From the vantage point of which credence function should you
make this decision? If it is still c, then the Greaves and Wallace argument says that you
should pick a conditionalizing plan for c at t1, and given that you also know E, you
should then adopt its recommendation and adopt c(−|E). Thus, if we are obliged to
take your credence function c at t0 also to be the credence function from whose vantage
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point you must choose between credal acts at t1, then we can also establish Diachronic
Conditionalization (narrow scope). But it isn’t clear that we are so obliged. After all, at
t1, we have evidence E and yet typically our credence function c from t0 will not encode
that evidence. Thus, c is flawed in a certain way. And, given this flaw, it isn’t obvious
that we must still turn to c for recommendations at t1.
In sum: if we grant Minimize Expected Inaccuracy, Greaves and Wallace’s argument
certainly establishes Plan Conditionalization (narrow scope); and, if supplemented with
further, controversial assumptions, it establishes Diachronic Conditionalization (narrow
scope). But this raises the question: should we grant Minimize Expected Inaccuracy?
We might wonder: what’s so special about c that it gets to dictate the credal act that we
should adopt even at t0?
Perhaps c is special because it is the credence function uniquely supported by the
evidence. But in that case, Greaves and Wallace have not shown that Conditionalization
is a norm governing all partial believers. They have shown that partial believers whose
credence functions are uniquely best supported by the evidence ought to conditionalize.
Or perhaps c is special because of the relation that believers bear to their own cre-
dence functions. If you choose an act with lower expected value over an act with higher
expected value, you are being instrumentally irrational. And if the value in question
is epistemic, then you are being epistemically irrational. This version of the argument
shows that there is something epistemically foolhardy about failing to conditionalize,
but it doesn’t establish that Conditionalization is a norm of logical consistency. It’s per-
fectly consistent to perform an act with low expected utility, like playing the lottery or
pursuing the career in arts; for many people, it even ends well.4 We propose that we can
do better: we can establish that violating Conditionalization is not just a bad idea, but
inconsistent. We can do this using an accuracy-dominance argument, which does not
rely on assuming anything about a particular initial credence function c.
Another concern about Minimize Expected Inaccuracy is that, even as a principle of
reasonableness, let alone as a norm of consistency, it is controversial. While all decision
theorists accept Dominance — at least in cases in which the acts to be evaluated are inde-
4[Redacted for review] suggests that we might supplement the second version of the expected accuracy dom-
inance argument with the observation that, no matter what beliefs you adopt consistent with the probability
calculus, planning to do anything other than conditionalize is foolhardy by your own lights. Perhaps this argu-
ment does establish Conditionalization as a norm of consistency. Our accuracy-dominance argument operates
by an interestingly different mechanism.
9
pendent of the states at which they are evaluated — many decision theorists reject prin-
ciples like Minimize Expected Inaccuracy. These are the non-expected utility theorists,
and they include those who would replace expected utility maximization as a norm by
something like prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] or rank-dependent utility
theory [Quiggin, 1982] or risk-weighted expected utility theory [Buchak, 2013] in which
Minimize Expected Inaccuracy is replaced by a different norm. They are motivated by
cases like the Allais paradox, in which people report preferences that cannot be ratio-
nalized by expected utility theory. Such preferences involve a level of risk aversion that
cannot be accommodated in expected utility theory by tweaking the utility function. But
if Minimize Expected Inaccuracy is controversial and Dominance is not, then surely an
argument for Conditionalization that assumes only the latter should be preferred over
one that assumes the former.
4 Pragmatic and epistemic arguments for Conditionaliza-
tion
Before we present our accuracy-dominance argument for Conditionalization, it will be
helpful to explain how the accuracy arguments for this norm — Greaves and Wallace’s
expected-accuracy argument and our new accuracy-dominance argument — relate to the
pragmatic arguments in its favour. There are two pragmatic arguments for Conditional-
ization, and they correspond naturally to the two accuracy arguments just mentioned.
The first, which is less well known, is an expected-utility argument due to Peter M.
Brown [1976]. Like Greaves and Wallace, Brown assumes that we have a prior probabilis-
tic credence function c onA, and an evidence partition E . Also like Greaves and Wallace,
he wishes to assess each candidate credal act defined on E from the vantage point of c;
and he wishes to do so using expected value. However, where Greaves and Wallace take
the value of a credal act to be its epistemic value and, in particular, its accuracy, Brown
takes its value to be its pragmatic value and, in particular, its utility. Now, what is the
pragmatic value, or utility, of a credal act? Brown assumes that there is a range of op-
tions between which you must choose. Each of these options is assigned a utility at each
state of the world. And thus, for any probabilistic credence function, there is a subset
of this range of options that contains the ones that maximise expected utility from the
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vantage point of that credence function. Let’s assume, furthermore, that our agent has a
tie-breaker function. So, if there is more than one option that maximises expected utility,
the agent uses her tie-breaker function to select exactly one of them as her choice. This is
the option that the agent would pick were she to have that credence function and were
she to be faced with that range of options. Brown then takes the pragmatic value of a
credal act at a state to be the utility of the option that the agent would pick were she to
receive as evidence whichever evidence proposition is true at that state. Thus, the prag-
matic value of a credal act is the value of the option it would lead you to choose if you
were to make your choice once the evidence is in and you have updated in line with that
credal act. Then Brown shows that, for any range of options, planning to conditionalize
on your current credence function when you obtain new evidence maximizes your ex-
pected utility. What’s more, for any credence function c, any evidence partition E , and
any credal act other than conditionalization, there is a range of options such that, if you
must choose between those options after your evidence comes in from that partition,
then you expect conditionalizing to do strictly better than the alternative. Therefore, you
should plan to conditionalize.
Clearly, this argument is closely related to the Greaves and Wallace argument. It uses
the same decision-theoretic norm — namely, Maximize Expected Utility — to choose
between credal acts on the basis of a prior credence function. It differs from the Greaves
and Wallace argument in the sort of value to which it appeals — Greaves and Wallace
appeal to epistemic value, or accuracy; Brown appeals to pragmatic value, or utility. For
Greaves and Wallace, the value of a credal act at a state is the accuracy of the credence
function it recommends at that state; for Brown, the value of a credal act at a state is the
utility of the option that you would choose were you to adopt the credence function it
recommends at that state.
The other, much better known pragmatic argument for Conditionalization is the so-
called diachronic Dutch book argument [Lewis, 2010]. This runs as follows:
First, some terminology: A credal strategy is a pair consisting of a credence function
c defined on A and a credal act a defined on an evidence partition E , where each aE is
defined on A. On our intended interpretation, a credal strategy is a two-stage plan that
specifies which credence function the believer will adopt at t0, before the evidence is in,
and which credence function she will adopt at t1, after she has learned which E in E is
true. We say that 〈c, a〉 is a probabilistic strategy if c is a probability function, while 〈c, a〉 is
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a conditionalizing strategy if a is a conditionalizing plan for c.
Now, as with all Dutch book arguments, this one makes an assumption about which
bets you will accept, given your credences: if you have credence p in proposition A,
then you will pay £Sp for a bet that returns £S if A is true and £0 if A is false. Granted
this, we can show that, if your credal strategy is 〈c, a〉 and 〈c, a〉 is not a probabilistic
and conditionalizing strategy, then there are books of bets B and BE for each E in E
such that (i) you will accept each of the bets in B now; (ii) you will accept each of the
bets in BE if you learn E and update your credence function to aE in accordance with
a; and (iii) whichever E you learn, it is guaranteed that B and BE will together lose you
money. Thus, your credal strategy leads you to choose a strongly dominated sequence of
options — if you had chosen instead to refuse all bets in B and BE, you would have been
guaranteed to do better. And it seems natural to say that, just as choosing a dominated
option is irrational, so it is irrational to adopt a credal strategy that sanctions choosing
such an option.
This is the pragmatic argument for Conditionalization that is most closely analogous
to the accuracy-dominance argument that we wish to present. It uses the same decision-
theoretic norm, namely, Dominance. It differs from our argument because it appeals
to pragmatic value rather than epistemic value. It shows that credal strategies that are
not probabilistic and conditionalizing sanction certain betting behaviour that, from the
point of view of pragmatic value, or utility, is dominated by refraining from betting.
Our argument, in contrast, shows that credal strategies that are not probabilistic and
conditionalizing are, from the point of view of epistemic value, or accuracy, dominated
by alternative strategies.
5 An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionaliza-
tion
Like Greaves and Wallace, we will assume that each agent is endowed with a set A
of propositions to which she assigns credences, a corresponding set S of epistemically
possible states of the world, and an evidence partition E ⊆ A. However, we will not
assume that each agent is endowed with a fixed initial credence function, or that she
chooses among epistemic acts. Instead, we assume that she chooses among the set of
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possible credal strategies.
The key conceptual move is to switch from measuring the inaccuracy of credal acts,
at states, to measuring the inaccuracy of credal strategies, also at states. This is a larger
conceptual step than the switch from measuring the inaccuracy of credence functions
to measuring the inaccuracy of credal acts. Given a way of measuring inaccuracy for
credence functions, we could pin down a unique right way of measuring inaccuracy for
credal acts. But to pin down a unique right way of measuring inaccuracy for credal
strategies, we need one more assumption:
Temporal Separability Is(〈c, a〉) = Is(c) + Is(a) (= Is(c) + Is(aEs))
Temporal Separability generalizes Separability; it says that the inaccuracy of a strategy,
i.e., a pair of credal acts, is the sum of the inaccuracies of the two acts in the strategy.5
Once we assume Temporal Separability, any way of measuring inaccuracy for individual
credence functions uniquely determines the inaccuracy of any pair of credence functions
at a state, and therefore uniquely determines the inaccuracy of any credal strategy at any
state.
Given the assumptions of Separability, Continuity, Extensionality, Strict Propriety,
and Temporal Separability, we can prove the following:
Theorem 1 Let I be a measure of inaccuracy satisfying Separability, Continuity, Exten-
sionality, Strict Propriety, and Temporal Separability. Then
(I) For each credal strategy that is not probabilistic, there is an alternative credal
strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing that weakly accuracy-dominates
it.
(II) For each credal strategy that is not conditionalizing, there is an alternative
credal strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing that strongly accuracy-
dominates it.
(III) For each credal strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing, there is no
alternative credal strategy whatsoever that even weakly accuracy-dominates it.
5In fact, our argument would go through if we took the inaccuracy of a credal strategy to be the weighted sum
of the inaccuracy of its components: that is,
Temporal Separability− For α, β > 0, Is(〈c, a〉) = αIs(c) + βIs(a)
Doing this would allow us to accommodate some degree of temporal discounting for epistemic choices, for
instance — if I care less about my future accuracy than my current accuracy, then I pick β < α.
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Now, suppose we adapt Accuracy Dominance for Credence Functions so that it applies
instead to credal strategies:
Accuracy Dominance for Credal Strategies A believer is rationally required not to adopt
a credal strategy 〈c, a〉 if there is an alternative credal strategy 〈c∗, a∗〉 such that (i)
〈c∗, a∗〉 strongly accuracy-dominates 〈c, a〉, and (ii) 〈c∗, a∗〉 is not itself even weakly
accuracy-dominated by any other credal strategy.
Then Theorem 1 shows that, if we measure inaccuracy using strictly proper inaccuracy
measures, then Accuracy Dominance for Credal Strategies entails at least the wide scope
version of Plan Conditionalization:
Plan Conditionalization (wide scope) If you know that between t0 and t1 you will learn
which member of the partition E is true (and nothing more), you should, at t0,
adopt a credence function c and a credal act a such that a is a conditionalizing plan
for c.
As with Greaves and Wallace’s expected-accuracy argument, we might ask whether our
accuracy-dominance argument establishes Plan Conditionalization (wide scope) only or
also Diachronic Conditionalization (wide scope) as well, or even the more familiar Di-
achronic Conditionalization (narrow scope).
Diachronic Conditionalization (wide scope) if between t0 and t1 you learn E and noth-
ing more, you should have a credence function c0 at t0 and a credence function c1
at t1 such that c1 = c0(−|E).
At this point, skeptics about Conditionalization may look askance. Should credal strate-
gies be subject to rational evaluation? Why should rationality require anyone to be con-
sistent over time? Someone who was consistent yesterday, and is consistent today, has
done enough to satisfy the demands of rationality.
But notice: the argument doesn’t just assume that believers should be consistent over
time; it provides a reason for consistency over time. At any given time, it is better to
have accurate beliefs than to have inaccurate ones. Furthermore, it is better for a person
to be more accurate over the course of a lifetime (in total or on average), than it is for that
person to be less accurate. The accuracy-dominance argument for Conditionalization
justifies the wide scope norm of diachronic consistency by appealing to the value of
diachronic accuracy.
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Of course, skeptics could still dig their heels in, and insist that what matters is ac-
curacy at a time — that accuracy across time is irrelevant. Or they could argue that,
while being accuracy-dominated across time is unfortunate, it is a misfortune that no
one can be blamed for — since the problem is not the believer’s credence function at
any one time, but rather, a global property of her behavior across time. We are not sure
how to adjudicate this debate with the skeptic. The accuracy-dominance argument is
an improvement on arguments that rely on the claim that rational beings are subject to
diachronic norms of consistency, but it is not yet a proof of Conditionalization based on
self-evident premises. It shows, at least, where the controversy should lie.
Can we infer from Diachronic Conditionalization (wide scope) to Diachronic Condi-
tionalization (narrow scope), the more familiar version of the Conditionalization norm?
We think not, and for the same reason that you can’t infer from a wide scope diachronic
norm in the practical case to the corresponding narrow scope diachronic norm. Suppose
that, on Saturday morning, I buy tickets to go to the cinema on Saturday evening. Then,
on Saturday afternoon, I think better of it, and I sell my tickets to a friend at slightly
less than I paid for them. Then there is a alternative strategy that dominates my actual
strategy. If I were to refrain from buying the tickets on the Saturday morning, and then
to refrain from selling them in the afternoon, I would end up with more money overall
than I end up with given my actual pair of actions, which guarantees me a loss. But that
doesn’t mean that, if I buy the tickets on Saturday morning, it is irrational for me to sell
them at a reduced price on Saturday afternoon. I bought the tickets because that was the
best choice by my lights in the morning; and I sold them again in the afternoon because
that was the best choice by my lights in the afternoon [Moss, 2015]. Between the morning
and the afternoon, I had changed my mind. And there is nothing irrational about chang-
ing your mind. The same holds in the epistemic case. Thus, our argument certainly
establishes Plan Conditionalization (wide scope). And we submit that it also establishes
Diachronic Conditionalization (wide scope). But it does not establish Diachronic Condi-
tionalization (narrow scope).
6 Conclusion
We have provided a new and illuminating argument that Conditionalization governs the
correct response to new evidence. While Conditionalization itself is widely accepted, the
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reasons for conditionalizing are still subject to dispute. It is more than merely a prag-
matic norm — the reasons for conditionalizing go beyond the fact that it is profitable.
But philosophers disagree about the deeper reasons to conditionalize. Our argument
provides an answer: failing to plan to conditionalize involves an inconsistency between
a believer’s credences, on the one hand, and her dispositions to change her mind in
response to new evidence, on the other. Any strategy that conflicts with Conditionaliza-
tion is self-defeating: it results in achieving lower accuracy than an available alternative,
come what may.
The key move in the argument was to generalize the concept of accuracy twice over.
First, we took advantage of Greaves and Wallace’s idea of measuring the accuracy of
credal acts, in addition to credence functions. Next, we generalized the concept of ac-
curacy to apply to strategies, or sequences of credal acts, in addition to individual acts.
Together, these steps allowed us to prove an accuracy-dominance theorem for Condi-
tionalization, using the assumption that we measure inaccuracy using a strictly proper
inaccuracy measure.
Armed with these new concepts, it is possible to show not just that Conditionalization
is a norm of rationality, but also something about why. Conditionalization is not just a
good idea — it’s a law of coherent updating.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Recall our
Theorem 1 Let I be a measure of inaccuracy satisfying Separability, Continuity, Exten-
sionality, Strict Propriety, and Temporal Separability. Then
(I) For each credal strategy that is not probabilistic, there is an alternative credal
strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing that weakly accuracy-dominates
it.
(II) For each credal strategy that is not conditionalizing, there is an alternative
credal strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing that strongly accuracy-
dominates it.
(III) For each credal strategy that is probabilistic and conditionalizing, there is no
alternative credal strategy whatsoever that even weakly accuracy-dominates it.
Our argument adapts and generalizes the proof in [de Finetti, 1974].
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7.1 Proof of Theorem 1(I)
Fix the algebra A = {X1, . . . , Xm} on which our agent’s credence functions are defined;
and fix the partition E = {E1, . . . , En} on which her credal acts are defined. Thus, sup-
pose c is defined onA and a is defined on E . If 〈c, a〉 is non-probabilistic, then we can find
a probabilistic strategy that weakly accuracy-dominates it. By Predd et. al.’s result, for
each credence function amongst c, aE1 , . . . , aEn that is not a probability function, there is
an alternative credence function that strongly accuracy-dominates it. If we replace each
such non-probabilistic credence function with one that strongly accuracy-dominates it,
then the resulting strategy weakly accuracy-dominates 〈c, a〉, since it does better in all
states in which some Ei holds for which we replaced aEi ; and in all states, if we replaced
c. QED.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1(II)
We begin by proving something that appears weaker than (II):
(II’) For each credal strategy that is not conditionalizing, there is an alternative credal
strategy that strongly accuracy-dominates it.
Then, later, we will show that at least one of the weakly (or strongly) accuracy-dominating
strategies must be probabilistic and conditionalizing.
We proceed in three steps.
1. Reformat strategies and states.
2. Find a particular accuracy-dominating strategy 〈c∗, a∗〉 (where c∗ is also defined on
A and a∗ is also defined on E ).
3. Show that 〈c∗, a∗〉 accuracy-dominates 〈c, a〉.
Reformatting Strategies The first step is to rewrite each strategy and each state as a
single vector with the same number of places. Suppose 〈c, a〉 is a credal strategy where
the domain of c and each aEi is A = {X1, . . . Xm}. Then we can create a vector ~c by
concatenating c with each of the aEi s, like so.
~c = c _ aE1 _ . . . _ aEn
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In other words,
~c = 〈c(X1), . . . c(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, aE1(X1), . . . , aE1(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aE1
, . . . , aEn(X1), . . . , aEn(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
aEn
〉
Reformatting States Suppose 〈c, a〉 is a strategy and s is a state that entails Ej. Let vs
be the valuation function for the state s: that is, vs(Xi) = 1 if s entails Xi; and vs(Xi) = 0
if s entails Xi. Then we can define a vector ~cs by taking the ~c generated by 〈c, a〉, and
replacing both c(Xi) and cEj(Xi) with vs(Xi), for each Xi in A. This gives us:
~cs = vs _ cE1 _ . . . cEj−1 _ vs _ cEj+1 . . . _ cEn
In other words,
~cs = 〈vs(X0), . . . vs(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vs
, cE1(X0), . . . , cE1(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cE1
, . . . ,
cEj−1(X0), . . . , cEj−1(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cEj−1
, vs(X0), . . . , vs(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vs
,
cEj+1(X0), . . . , cEj+1(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ej+1
, . . . , cEn(X0), . . . , cEn(Xm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cEn
〉
Characterizing Conditionalization A crucial component of Predd, et al.’s proof
that all and only the probabilistic credence functions are non-dominated is a geometric
characterization of those credence functions. They show that c is a probability function
iff c is in the convex hull of the vss. That is, the set of probability function is precisely
the convex hull of {vs : s ∈ S}. By reformatting the strategies and states as we have
just down, we can give a similarly useful alternative characterization of conditionalizing
strategies.
Lemma 3 Given that~c = 〈c, a〉 is a probabilistic strategy,~c is a conditionalizing strategy
iff~c is in the convex hull of {~cs : s ∈ S}.
Proof of Lemma 3:
(Left-to-right) To show the left-to-right direction, we suppose that~c = 〈c, a〉 is a condi-
tionalizing strategy, and show that ~c is in the convex hull of {~cs : s ∈ S}. That is, we
show that there are non-negative real numbers λs (for s ∈ S) such that~c = ∑s λs~cs.
1. Let λs = c(s)
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2. c = ∑s λsvs
(By 1, and the assumption that c is a probability function)
3. Since 〈c, a〉 is a conditionalizing strategy, for each Ei ∈ E and X ∈ A,
c(Ei)aEi (X) = c(X ∩ Ei)
Thus:
aEi (X) = aEi (X)− c(Ei)aEi (X) + c(X ∩ Ei)
= (1− c(Ei))aEi (X) + c(X ∩ Ei)
= ∑
s 6⊆Ei









(Right-to-left) To show the right-to-left direction, suppose that~c = 〈c, a〉 is in the convex




First, we note that λs = c(s). By assumption, c(s) = ∑s′∈S λs′vs′(s). But vs′(s) = 1, if
s = s′; and vs′(s) = 0, if s 6= s′. Thus, c(s) = λs, as required.
This allows us to infer the following: for each evidence proposition Ei and proposi-
tion X,
aEi (X) = ∑
s 6⊆Ei





c(s)aEi (X) + ∑
s⊆Ei
c(s)vs(X)
= (1− c(Ei))aEi (X) + c(X ∩ Ei)
And from this, we obtain:
c(Ei)aEi (X) = c(X ∩ Ei)
That is,~c = 〈c, a〉 is a conditionalizing strategy.
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Reformatting Inaccuracy Scores In the accuracy-dominance argument for Proba-
bilism, Predd et al. [2009] prove the following: if I is a separable and continuous strictly
proper inaccuracy measure, and c is a non-probabilistic credence function, then there is
a probabilistic credence function c∗ such that Is(c∗) < Is(c) for all states s. A crucial
component in that proof is the following idea: Intuitively, the inaccuracy of a credence
function is its distance from the truth. More precisely, the inaccuracy of a credence func-
tion, c, at a state of the world, s, is the distance from the valuation function of that state
(namely, vs) to the credence function (namely, c). And indeed, as Predd et al. show, each
separable and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure is generated as follows:
take a certain sort of distance function; use that distance function to measure the dis-
tance from the valuation function vs to the credence function c; and take the inaccuracy
of c at s to be given by that distance. The class of distance functions is the class of additive
Bregman divergences.
Each additive Bregman divergence is characterised by a continuous, differentiable,
strictly convex function f : [0, 1] → [0, ∞) [Banerjee et al., 2005]. Given such an f , the
corresponding additive Bregman divergence D f : [0, 1]n × [0, 1]n → [0, ∞] is




f (xi)− f (yi)− f ′(yi)(xi − yi)
where f ′ is the first derivative of f . One famous additive Bregman divergence is squared
Euclidean distance: that is, SED(~x,~y) = ∑i(xi− yi)2. A little calculation shows that SED
is generated by f (x) = x2. Thus, the first crucial result from Predd, et al. is this:
Lemma 1 I is a separable and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure iff there is
an additive Bregman divergence D such that Is(c) = D(vs, c) for all states s and
credence functions c.
This idea — that separable and continuous inaccuracy measures are generated by ad-
ditive Bregman divergences — will be crucial in our proof as well. Thus, we prove the
following claim:
Lemma 2 If Is(c) is a proper scoring rule, then there is a Bregman divergence D such
that
Is(〈c, a〉) = D(~cs,~c)
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose I is a proper scoring rule. Then, by Lemma 1, there is a
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Bregman divergence D such that, for any credence function c, Is(c) = D(vs, c). Now
suppose s is a state that entails Ej. Then
D(~cs,~c) = D(vs, c) +D(vs, aEj) + ∑
i 6=j
D(aEi , aEi )
= D(vs, c) +D(vs, aEj) (since D(aEi , aEi ) = 0 for all i)
= Is(c) + Is(aEj)
= Is(〈c, a〉) (by Temporal Separability)
Finding a Dominating Strategy The accuracy-dominance argument that Predd et
al. give is based on the following fact about Bregman divergences:
Lemma 4 Let D be an additive Bregman divergence. And let X be a set of vectors. Then
if the vector z lies outside the closed convex hull of X , then there is another vector
z∗ that lies in the convex hull of X such that D(x, z∗) < D(x, z) for all x in X — that
is, for each member x of X , the divergence from x to z∗ is less than the divergence
from x to z.
This fact will be crucial in our proof as well — but we won’t prove it here.
Suppose ~c = 〈c, a〉 is not a conditionalizing strategy. Then, as we have just estab-
lished, ~c lies outside the closed convex hull of the ~css — since the set of ~css is finite, its
convex hull is guaranteed to be closed. So, by the fact just stated, there is a vector ~c∗
inside that convex hull that is closer to each~cs than~c is. Furthermore, ~c∗ corresponds to
a unique strategy 〈c∗, a∗〉, where
~c∗ = c∗ _ a∗E1 _ . . . _ a
∗
En
Now, we know that, for each~cs, D(~cs, ~c∗) < D(~cs,~c). But, from Lemma 1 above, we know
that D(~cs, ~c∗) = Is(〈c∗0 , a∗〉) and D(~cs,~c) = Is(〈c, a〉). Thus, we know that, for each state
s,
Is(〈c∗0 , a∗E 〉) < Is(〈c, a〉)
That is, ~c = 〈c, a〉 is strongly accuracy-dominated by ~c∗ = 〈c∗, a∗〉, as required. This
completes the proof of (I’) from above. Recall: (I’) is the seemingly weaker version of (I).
It claims only that each credal strategy that isn’t both probabilistic and conditionalizing
is dominated. It does not say anything about the sort of credal strategies that do the
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dominating. We now use (I’) to establish (I).
Finding a Probabilistic and Conditionalizing Dominating Strategy Suppose
that there are k states. Thus, S = {s1, . . . , sk}. Then, for any credal strategy~c = 〈c, a〉, let
I(~c) := 〈Is1(~c), . . . , Isk (~c)〉 ∈ [0, ∞]
n
We will call this the inaccuracy vector of the credal strategy~c. Given two credal strategies
~c1 and ~c2, we write I(~c1) < I(~c2) if Isi (~c1) < Isi (~c2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. That is, I(~c1) <
I(~c2) if~c1 strongly accuracy-dominates~c2.
Suppose ~c0, . . . ,~cα, . . . is a transfinite sequence of credal strategies (where the se-
quence is defined on the ordinal λ). And suppose I(~cβ) < I(~cα) for all β > α — that
is, each credal strategy strongly accuracy-dominates all earlier ones. Then, since I(~c) is
bounded below by 〈0, . . . , 0〉, we have that the sequence I(~c0), . . . ,I(~cα), . . . converges
to a limit, by a transfinite version of the Monotone Convergence Theorem. Further, by a
transfinite version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, there is a transfinite subsequence
~ci0 , . . . ,~ciα , . . ., unbounded in the original sequence (and defined on ordinal γ ≤ λ), that






Thus,~c is a credal strategy whose inaccuracy vector is the limit of the inaccuracy vectors
of the pairs in the original sequence. As a result, I(~c) < I(~cα), for all α < λ.
Suppose~c = 〈c, a〉 is a non-conditionalizing strategy. Then we can define the follow-
ing sequence of credal strategies by transfinite recursion on the first uncountable ordinal.
• BASE CASE ~c0 = 〈c, a〉
• SUCCESSOR ORDINAL ~cλ+1 is any pair that strongly accuracy dominates~cλ, if such
exists; and~cλ, if not.
• LIMIT ORDINAL ~cλ is the strategy defined as above whose inaccuracy vector is the
limit of the inaccuracy vectors of the strategies~cα for α < λ.
Then we can show that there must be α such that ~cα = ~cα+1. After all, there are at most
continuum-many distinct pairs in the list I(~c0), . . . ,I(~cα), . . .. Thus, ~cα dominates the
non-conditionalizing strategy ~c0 = 〈c, a〉. But ~cα is not itself dominated. Thus, ~cα must
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be a conditionalizing strategy, as required.
This completes the proof of (II). QED.
Proof of Theorem 1(III)
Suppose that 〈c, a〉 is probabilistic and conditionalizing. Then, by Strict Propriety and
the supposition that c is a probability function, c assigns itself a strictly higher degree
of expected accuracy than it assigns to any other credal act. By Greaves and Wallace’s
result, a enjoys maximal expected accuracy from the vantage point of c. So, by Temporal
Separability, 〈c, a〉 enjoys minimal expected inaccuracy from the vantage point of c. But a
strategy that weakly accuracy-dominated 〈c, a〉 would have expected inaccuracy greater
than or equal to the expected inaccuracy of 〈c, a〉. Therefore, no other strategy weakly
accuracy-dominates 〈c, a〉.
This completes the proof of (III). QED.
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